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That post modernism is a general cultural mood and a style in
art, architecture, and literature is uncontroversial. But does post-
modernism present a coherent intellectual doctrine or theory of
politics, art, or life? In the discussion which follows, I will
concentrate on two aspects of the intellectual pretensions of
postmodernism. First, I examine the postmodernist claim to justify
the idea that the postmodern world is characterized by a general
indeterminacy of meaning. Next I will look at aspects of the
postmodernist contention that the present age has witnessed the
decline of individuality.
If there is an intellectual core to posunodernism, it will be found
in French-derived poststructuralist thought. At the centre of
poststTucturalism is the idea that the Enlightenment has run its course,
that the seventeenth century's grand narrati ves, its ambitions to
provide universal keys to reality, have failed. Such postmodem talk
of the end of the Enlightenment is premature. Of course, there is
no question that many of the grand narratives which captivated
the imaginations of our forebears have indeed collapsed. The
seventeenth-century idea that the study of matter in motion would
eventually allow us to predict not onl y the motions of the planets, but
even human behaviour is dead-as dead as the idea that the will of
God dramatized by the passion and resurrection of Jesus could
explain all of human history. Marxism, the grand narrative which
gave shape to the intellectual aspirations of youth of many French
poststructuralliterary theorists, has also fallen into its own decline, at
least as an all-encompassing theoretical scheme. as has the dream that
unchained capitalism would lead mankind into a golden age. But the
erosion of these particular 'ultimate answers' does not necessarily
spell the end of every Enlightenment hope.
Poststructuralist critics of the Enlightenment have sometimes
faulted it for the faith that history is moving toward some sort of
omega point, an optimism which poststructuralist thought has
sensibly given up. But at the same time, the spirit of prophecy is not
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entirely gone from poststructuralism, as is shown by the fondness of
some poststructuralists for the phrase 'late capitalism'-as though
they could know that the present economic arrangements of the
Western democracies is just about over; this pseudo-prophetic usage
is the intellectual's equivalent of walking the streets with a sign
proclaiming the imminent end of the world. Philosophers are not
seers, and when they try to assume a prophetic tone-as Heidegger
on technology-they risk simply being ridiculous. Nevertheless,
poststructuralism is certainly correct in questiomng great intellectual
schemes which promise to install utopia on earth or make sense of all
human life and relations. But, after all, in so doing they are perfectly
in tune with the spirit of the Enlightenment's own attack on the
Christian metanarrative.
Nor has poststructuralism's treatment of everybody's grand
narratives been consistent. Freud's general account of human
reality is perhaps as grand as any, yet he has been treated most
leniently by poststructuralists: criticized, called into question, but
never thoroughly debunked and rejected. And even where totalizing
!1arratives have been scoffed at, it is remarkable to consider the extent
to which they have been replaced by other, just as totalizing,
poststructuralist narratives: Michel Foucault's theory of power and
oppression, for instance, which has much of the dramatic appeal of
the stories of sin and redemption which captivated Christendom.
But while inconsistency about the usefulness of grand narratives
on the part of postmodern thought is problematic, it does not indicate
the deeper frivolity of the poststructuralist dismissal of the
Enlightenment. Consider postmodern theory in relation to the
history of natural science for the last three centuries or so. What
does one get from poststructuralist theory on the subject of natural
science? Except for feeble clich~s about quantum mechanical
indeterminacy or paradoxes of relativity theory. practically nothing.
Episodes in the history of science in the twentieth century are used as
a sort of mythology to help poststructuralists support their rejection of
the totalizing tendencies of Enlightenment. These poststructuralist
myths have exactly as much philosophical weight as post-Einsteinian
claims of seventy years ago that Special Relativity might tell us
something important about cross-cultural 'relativity' in morality.
Moreover, if one pays any attention to the actual state of natural
science as the twentieth century nears its dose. it is not surprising that
postmodern theorists have little of significance to say on the subject.
The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century has accelerated
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into the twentieth, bringing levels of comprehension and technological
power older generations could not even dream of. For the current
state of natural science testifies not only to the.persistence of one of
the totalizing tendencies of the Enlightenment, but of its astonishing
success.
In his good-natured and enthusiastic attempts to make sense of the
postmodern temper, Ihab Hassan has discussed natural science in
relation to postmodernism. 1 He does not fail to appreciate the
problems of bringing the two topics together, admitting outright that
'current analogies between science, culture, and sundry artistic and
spiritual phenomena can prove too facile,' (p.63) that it may be that
scientific concepts 'should not be confused with cultural metaphors
and literary tropes.' Still, this doesn't stop him from promoting those
very analogies, using scientific concepts as metaphors and tropes in
the most facile manner (having it both ways-to be critical of shallow
comparisons yet make them all the same-is itself symptomatic of the
postmodern mood). It was 1905, Hassan tells us, the year of the
appearance of Special Relativity, that science reached the turning
point: 'As Einstein succinctly put it: "There is no absolute motion'"
(p.55). The inadequacy of this as a summary of Einstein will be
apparent only to readers who know physics, but there will be
thankfully few of these among those humanists who study Hassan's
article. And on he goes with the name dropping, through Rcimannian
space and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, and Bohr's Principle of
Complementarity. Heisenberg, he declares, shows that 'Mechanism,
determinism, materialism recede before the flux of consciousness, a
kind of noetic Heraclitean fire ... In such rarefied realms of reason, a
humanist, modern or postmodern , gasps for breath' (pp.5R,60).(lt
shouldn't surprise us to find poststructuralists gasping for breath as
they attempt to come to terms with the physics of seventy or eighty
years agO-Dne must know a considerable hunk of mathematics and
have some background in classical physics to understand relativity
and quantum mechanics. We have, however, no evidence that most of
the major names of poststructural theory-Lyotard, for example, or
Derrida-know very much about natural science beyond what they
might remember of their school days.)
The invocation of physics in this way to support postmodern
anitudes may seem to add lustre or weight to postmodernism, but the
Ihab Hassan, The Pastll/odem Turn, Athens, Ohio, 1987, csp. pp.46-83.
25
The Sydney Society oJ Literature and Aesthetics
effect is yet another illusion. First, the science Hassan invokes, along
with its attendant paradoxes is very old by any postmodernist
standard. It is, in fact, exactly what textbooks tend to call 'modern'
science. What is more important to appreciating the futility of
Hassan's discussion is the irrelevance of quantum mechanics to the
actual state of science in this postmodern time. The paradoxes of
quantum mechanics have no effect whatsoever on well over 99 per
cent of the actual conduct of the physical and biological sciences in the
late twentieth century. The paradoxes are intellectually stimulating
material for philosophers of science, subatomic physicists, and
cosmologists, but they have no effect on work done in almost every
other area of science. Let us remind ourselves for a moment of the
sort of things science as it is currently practised can accomplish. The
story of modern science since the seventeenth century is not a story of
increasing uncertainty, but just the reverse. The astonishing
achievements in controlling or eradicating disease, the inventions of
electronic technology, the discoveries of space and planetary science,
the emerging techniques of genetic engineering, all illustrate a
situation in contemporary natural science completely contrary to the
view Hassan purports to describe with his myths of quantum
indeterminacy. The totalizing ideals of the Enlightenment really
are succeeding in natural science-there clearly is progress in
understanding and controlling the material world. While postmodern
humanists talk to themselves about the failure of the Enlightenment, it
buzzes past, unaffected by the empty tropes and metaphors.
When Ha<;san claims that relativity and uncertainty are concepts
that 'constitute our [presumahly post modern) cuIturallanguages; they
arc part of a new order of [presumahly postmodern) knowledge ... "
he is engaging in a form of intellectual kitsch. This German word
(verkitschen, to make cheaply. to cheapen) is often used to refer to
any form of popular art or entertainment. but it has especially come to
designate objects which pretentiously borrow their sense of beauty,
emotion. or profundity from elsewhere. The perfect example of kitsch
is the religious souvenir: ugly taken by itself. it begs for acceptance
hy reason of its associations, the meanings it derives from spirituality.
In this sense. kitsch objects are parasitic. But kitsch is also designed
to appeal to a self-image of its viewers or consumers. In his long
meditation on the concept of kitsch in The Unbearable Lightness
of Being. Milan Kundera characterises kitsch as calling forth 'the
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second tear.' The first tear we shed out of pity or some other worthy
emotion; the second tear we shed in recognition of our own worthy
feeling of pity. Kitsch is designed to appeal.to an image we have of
ourselves, and our response to kitsch is very often essentially self-
congratulatory.
That is why it is not merely in the area of religious or sentimental
art that we find kitsch, but in philosophy and intellectual discourse
as well. It is plain that a strong sense of self-congratulation
and attempted self-justification is at work in the invocations of
Heisenberg, Bohr, and Einstein by postmodern theorists. Scientific
ideas and jargon are used by them as an exercise in intellectual
parasitism; the essential function is not to inform us of what
Heisenberg might have said relevant to postmodern cultural
conditions, but to soothe and flatter postmodern cultural theorists, to
give their theories prestige. I remarked that the kitsch object does
not deepen our understanding of emotions or ideas, but is limited
to reminding us of great works of art, deep emotions, or grand
philosophic, religious, or patriotic sentiments. In this way, I view
Hassan's invocations of quantum mechanics as kitsch: they speak
only of postmodern theory's nervous longing to achieve intellectual
respectability. There is something touchingly middle-class about
postmodern theory in its eagerness to be all up-to-date, even avant
garde, but at the same time respectable. Just as some middle-class
people own expensively bound copies of classic books which they
display in their lounges but never read. so do postmodern theorists
love references to Einstein and scientific theories (real theories)
which, alas, they do not understand.
But if borrowing uncomprehended and undigested physics is a
form of kitsch, what about borrowing undigested and barely
comprehended poststructuralist thought as a way of trying to give
respectability to postmodernist art and culture? After all. as popularly
conceived, postmodernism is supposed to include the idea that we can
borrow from any and every culture-in our food, our dress, our
jewellery, our architecture, and our hairstyles. To recall Lyotard, we
'listen to heavy metal rock, watch Hollywood westerns, eat American
fast food for lunch, local cuisine for dinner, wear Paris perfume
in Tokyo, and recycled cloths in Hong Kong'.2 It includes
and celebrates the global reach of media, especially television,
2 Jean-f'ran\ois Lyotard. The Post-Modern Conlillian. tr. G Dennington and
D Massumi. Minneapolis, 19!14. p.63.
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the informational society, and recreational shopping. It features
entertainment as a dominant ideology (to call entertainment an
'ideology' is already pretentious). along with consumerism and the
art of exhaustion. At the same time validating a cynical acceptance
of all this, postmodernism is in some accounts even supposed to
deliver a political critique of it-for example, the politically correct,
and oh-so-pricey art of Barbara Kruger.
Given the vast confusion of ideas and attitudes postmodernism
is supposed to incorporate, it would be unrealistic to expect
poststructuralism, or any other purportedly coherent philosophical
theory, to supply an intellectual underpinning for it. Poststructuralist
theory gained currency back in the 1960s as a critique of prevailing
ideas of conservative literary French establishment. Barthes's
1Iouvelle critique was intended to debunk the idea that the author/ god
was a controlling presence that determined the meaning of a text, or
that texts had fixed meanings at all which it was criticism's joh to
ascertain. But we have to ask ourselves whether this bit of literary
theory can be imperialistically expanded into a cultural theory in
general, or at least one that somehow supports or validates something
as chaotic as postmodernism. I do not think so. In fact, the use of
poststructuralist theory to provide a philosophical rationale for
postmodernism is just another exercise in borrowing your
respectability from somewhere else-another foml of kitsch.
Seen in this light. postmodern culture presents us with a veritable
chain of kitsch borrowing. At the top of the chain are physicist",
innocently going about their work in subatomic physics and making
incidental statements ahout the limits of what can be known ahout
elementary particles. Next come poststructuralist philosophers, who.
though they understand no physics, remove from their original
context such words as 'indeterminacy' and appropriate them to give
an aura of prestige to their theories of literary criticism. Next we
have postmodern artists and their salesmen. who, though they do
not understand it, are happy to horrow poststructuralistlpostmodern
philosophical rhetoric to give an intellectual sheen to their wares.
Finally comes the buyer of the work of postrnodern art, who doesn't
understand the work. or the philosophy which validates it, or the
physics which validates the philosophy, but who places it in his living
room (next to the leather-bound books), certain that he has made the
right investment.
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The kitsch use of the prestige of science to lend respectability to
postmodernism as a intellectual phenomenon is in my view simply
silly. But what of the actual positive pronouncements philosophical
postmodernism makes in its own account? One of its most publicized
contentions involves that so-called death of the subject. This idea of
an end of a special place for subjective individuality in the postmodcrn
era parallels the poststructuralist attack in literary theory on any sort of
privileged place for authorship and with it such associated concepts as
artistic genius, the importance of art as individual expression, the
controlling presence in criticism of authorial intention, and so forth.
The thesis is that in the context of art modernism was essentially a
form of aesthetic expressionism, that it was, as the postmodern
theorist Fredric Jameson puts it, 'predicated on the invention of a
personal, private style, as unmistakable as your fingerprint ... ' In the
modernist view, this was 'linked to the conception of a unique self
and a private identity, a unique personality and individuality, which
can generate its own unique vision of the world and forge its own
unique, unmistakable style.' Against this, Jameson says, scholars and
'those of us who work in the area of culture and cultural and formal
change, are all exploring the notion that that kind of individualism and
personal identity is a thing of the past ... ' Jameson holds that in light
of the emergence of corporate capitalism, and the rise of state and
business bureaucracies, 'that older bourgeois individual subject no
longer exists'.3
The idea Jameson presents has become very widespread among
cultural theorists of late. One finds, for example, another instance of it
in Michael Heim's Electric Language, a book which discusses the
increasingly widespread use by authors of electronic word
processors, instead of typewriters or pen and paper. Heim argues that
the interconnectedness of word processing machines-the simple fact
that they can be wired into each other-will lead to an erosion of the
sense of private authorship, of the writer seen as a unique private
individual.4 And more generally, Ihab Hassan has taken 'self-Iess-
ness' as a mark of the postmodern moment: 'Postrnodernism vacates
the traditional self ... postmodernism suppresses or disperses and
sometimes tries to recover the "deep" romantic ego, which remains
3 Fredric Jameson. 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society.' in The Anti-
Aesthetic: Essays on Postlllodern Culture. cd. Hal Foster. Seattle, 1983,
pp.112-15.
4 Michaeillcim, Electric Language, New Haven, 1987.
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under dire suspicion in poststructuralist circles as a "totalizing
principle".•
It would be difficult to overestimate the emptiness of these
proclamations of the death of the individual in the postmodern era.
I concentrate on this question because it illustrates the tendency of the
theorists of postmodernism to convince themselves of ideas that are
plainly false. In fact, there is no evidence whatsoever that subjective
individuality is on the wane in the present-day world; if anything, the
status and place of the individual in the postmodern era-in the arts
and in public life in general-is increasingly just the reverse of what
postmodernist philosophers claim.
Consider Heim's claim that in a computer-driven age authorship
will be diminished as a private event, so to speak-this on account of
the connections between computers. My telephone is interconnected
in principle with virtually every other telephone in the world, but I
have not noticed with this condition any loss of my individuality or
that of anyone else. Of course, computers can be connected with each
other. but they need not be, and in any event, there is no reason to
suppose that this fact need have bearing on the place of individuality.
There is no evidence whatsoever that by using computers to write,
contemporary authors are facing increased anonymity. The machine
simply makes the expression of individual style that much easier.
Here as elsewhere when postmodern theorists start to talk. reality is
soon ignored in favour of uncritical acceptance of the fashionable
clich~s.
And what of the more general contention that the integrity, the
unique individuality of the artist or literary author is eclipsed in the
postrnodem era? One has only to pick up any current art magazine to
see the preposterousness of this claim. The interest of audiences in
individual artists is as great as it ever was in the arts-and this
concern is not limited to consumers of painting, where the cash value
of the work may intensify attention to the identity of the artist. When
one looks at the current state of music, of literature, and of dramatic
arts. one sees no dimming of the interest of the audience in the artist's
identity. and no decline on the part of artists in trying to establish
Jameson's 'unique, private style.' Of course, as in all other historical
times, most artists today do not possess a personal style of expression
powerful enough to capture great public attention (lacking. as most
do, what Tolstoy referred to as 'individuality'), but that does not
mean that the concept of individuality has suffered a post modern
decline or that there is anything currently unconventional about the
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desirability of developing a uniquely personal character in one's art.
If there is change in the attitude toward individuality in the
postmodern era, it will be seen to be at its base demographic rather
than philosophical. While value continues to be placed on individual
identity. the American art schools alone produce. according to Robert
Hughes, approximately 35,000 graduates per year, and with similar
rates elsewhere in the Western world. the global output of aspiring
artists is staggering. To this we may add literary output (in the U.S ..
there are around 40.000 books published every year, and I was
recently told by a Viking! Penguin author that Penguin published
about one new title every working day of the year-five per week). It
is in such cold statistics we will find the basis for a lack of
overwhelmingly predominant. individual geniuses in the arts today. If
there is any clement of truth in the post modernist claims about
individuality, it may be simply that in a world with so many working
artists who have so much access to the whole history of art and
contemporary developments outside of their own culture. there will be
an inevitable pastiche, eclecticism, or pluralism, a lack of a clear.
identifiable style or the sort we identify in the history of art-when.
say, Beethoven or Wagner were dominant in European music. While
there is today in the arts no less interest in individuality. there
certainly is an overload. an excess of individuals competing for
attention and willing to experiment with any and every historical and
contemporary style and effect.
Although postmodern theorists are the main exponents of the
decline of individual subjectivity in society and the arts, their ideas
do rub off on artists: I have frequently heard from artists that the cult
of individual genius is dead. so much outdated romantic mythology.
While there might for some artists be a small self-serving convenience
in the idea (if individual genius doesn't exists. no one can be faulted
for not displaying it). there is nothing I can identify in their lives
and behaviour that shows they really believe the importance of
individuality is in decline. Many artists would give anything to
achieve the celebrity and cult status of names like 'Picasso.'
'Warhol,' or even 'McCahon'.
That contemporary artists are as eager as ever for attention as
unique individuals is demonstrated by that fact that they tend to treat
their work as an expression of individual subjectivity in discussion
and documentation. That the privileged position of the author/ artist
is not entirely dead in the minds of artists is also indicated by
the unceasing tendency of artists everywhere-including those who
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style themselves 'postmodern' -angrily to dispute hostile critical
interpretations of their work which 'fail to comprehend' their
intentions, which 'miss the point' of their work. For many artists,
complete freedom of interpretation is fine as a general philosophical
theory applied to other people's work, but not to their own.
(And it isn't just the likes of artists and writers of creative fiction
who fail to act on the theory that private authorship is a thing of the
past, but also, if I may add a personal note, academic theorists
themselves. For fifteen years I have been editing. an academic journal,
Philosophy and Literature, which publishes work wrinen by scholars
in many humanistic disciplines. In that time I have not noticed any
lack of interest by champions of poststructural thought in identifying
the authorship of their own articles-no suggestions of anonymous
publication, the use of initials, no hint that so far as they are
concerned private authorship is a thing of the past. I have never
received an unsigned submission or an article submitted with a
request for anonymous publication.)
Where in the advancing late-twentieth century, in lands where the
Enlightenment has any kind of hold, do we find evidence to support
Jameson's claim that 'we are witnessing the end of individualism as
such'? Everywhere we look, and particularly in art and politics, the
individual, the unique personal subjectivity, seen either as moral or
creative agent, is more important than ever before. TIlls state of affairs
in my opinion is yet another achievement of postmodernism's own
chosen antagonist, the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment separation of the distinct spheres, science,
morality. and art-the basic division is already exemplified by Kant's
three great Critiques-intimately involved the idea of progress.
Progress in science has continued undiminished for three centuries
and is today accelerating. The case is similar with Enlightenment
notions of moral progress. When we consider human conduct,
including politics, we see again that the Enlightenment ideals of
respect for individual autonomy within a secular moral system are
today more widely appreciated and practised than at any other time in
human history. Ugly exceptions to this generalization immediately
come to mind, but their very conspicuousness testifies to the fact that
in contemporary culture the individual counts more than ever before.
Within large, organised societies the Kingdom of Ends envisioned by
Kant was, until the twentieth century, limited to a relatively small
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circle of the human race; the great mass of humanity laboured
without political rights to support the few. But the Kantian notions of
freedom and inteIlectual independence are spreading throughout the
world-indeed, almost as rapidly as Enlightenment ideals and practice
of science.
We can no longer, for example, view Asia in crypto-racist fashion
as comprising mere faceless hoards of humanity. Enlightenment
ideals are taking hold there too, with Japan today not only a
formidable technological power, but a liberal democracy in the
postmodern mould. Its democracy is not our version. as its culture is
not ours. But neither is it what Hegel could have caIled an Oriental
despotism. Individuals everywhere in the world count more than they
ever have in recorded history. and where European culture has
established itself without much penetration of Enlightenment ideals
(feudal areas of South America, for example, with their endemic
fusion of Indian superstition and medieval Catholicism), it is not only
technological backwardness that is a problem, but cultural brutality as
well. The changes we are seeing over the postmodern world do not
attest to the failure of the Enlightenment; rather. they are a direct
expression of the increasing hold that Enlightenment ideals of
individual autonomy, or freedom. has on global culture. These ideals,
espoused by thinkers such as Kant and Mill. and embodied. whether
fultilled or not, in the American and French revolutions. have a hold
on more of the human race than ever before in history. This is not
philosophical pipe-dreaming. it is a world-demographic fact.
To observe these things is, however, something of an
embarrassment. The mood of post modernism, at least among
inteIlectuals, is characterized as one of exhaustion, horedom. and
narcissism. There is all of this in it. and perhaps a hit of laziness as
well. But there is something else which can be identified as fear.
Theorists who adopt a rhetoric in which reason itself is caIled
'terroristic' are clearly afraid of something, though it is hard to
imagine how it can be reason. Again, rhetoric about the 'totalizing'
aspects of science and technology should strike us as strange, in so
far as science has proved itself one of the great Iiherating forces of
human history. All of these postmodernist tendencies are. however.
epitomized in what the aesthetician Dmitri Khanin has persuasively
described as a horror at the wild horizon of history. an anxiety at the
very idea that history is capable of progress. It is one thing to reject
the notion that history is moving toward a preconceived target-many
people would gladly join post modern theory in giving up that
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conception. But it is quite another matter to reject the Enlightenment
idea of progress altogether. Just because we, like every other
historical generation, cannot know where history is headed, that
does not entail the unreality of progress. Whither we go may be
unknown, but we are clearly going some place.
Here perhaps lies postmodernism's greatest failure of nerve: as
Khanin puts it, where the modernist posture was one of pathfinder
and conqueror, the postmodernist prefers the passive life of a voyeur.
The former posture may have been presumptuous, but the latter is
senseless. Why this mood of fatigue has so much current appeal in
the industrialised world is, I readily admit, mysterious to me. I can
only affirm my view that the Enlightenment in its modernist and
postmodernist manifestations is still a vital enterprise in science,
politics, and even art. Though its completion is nowhere within our
sights, it demands our active engagement.
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